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THE NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT OF 1993: CONSIDERING THE
ELECTION To APPLY THE NEW LAW To OLD CORPORATIONS
James Edward Harris*
The Arkansas Nonprofit Corporation Act of 19931 (hereinafter
the "Act") creates a comprehensive corporate code which applies
to all Arkansas nonprofit corporations incorporated after 1993.2
Nonprofits chartered before 1994 may elect to become subject to
the provisions of the Act by amending their articles of incorporation
after December 31, 1993.1 The Act addresses many questions which
are unanswered by the existing statutes, provides clear and complete
rules for corporate governance and action, and establishes modern
standards of conduct for directors and officers. These substantial
advantages will lead most existing nonprofits to consider opting to
be governed by the Act. This article will describe principal features
of the Act and will analyze the factors which favor making the
election. Essential to any consideration of electing under the new
law is an understanding of the deficiencies of the old statutes. Thus,
a preliminary discussion of the development of this legislation may
be helpful.
I. HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE PROJECT
The old law was enacted thirty years ago, 4 in a day when
nonprofit corporations in our state were limited in number and
complexity. Today there are many more such entities in existence,
and the percentage of corporations which are nonprofits has increased
dramatically.' Of the approximately 100,000 corporations on file with
* The author and Greg Graham served as co-Chairmen of the Arkansas Bar
Association Tax Section Committee which developed the legislative proposal for
the Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993. The other members of the committee were
Steve Bauman, Joe Hickey, Wilson Jones, John Lessel, Tom Overbey and Obert
Undhem, all of whom contributed greatly to that effort.
1. 1993 Ark. Acts 1147 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-101 to -1707
(Michie Supp. 1993)).
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-1701 to -1707 (Michie Supp. 1993). January 1,
1994 is specified as the effective date of the Act. Id. § 4-33-1706.
3. Id. § 4-33-1701.
4. 1963 Ark. Acts 176 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-201 to -206 and
4-28-209 to -223 (Michie 1991)).
5. In a broad sense, there are probably more nonprofit than business organ-
izations in United States today. HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS, § 1 (5th ed. 1988).
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the Arkansas Secretary of State, a surprising 30,000 of them are
nonprofits. 6 Some of them, most notably hospitals, universities and
other major charities, have complicated organizational structures and
operations with very large budgets, which rival those of major
business corporations. 7 In this environment there was a widespread
perception among attorneys who counsel nonprofits that our existing
law was woefully inadequate. Indeed, legal scholars have described
old nonprofit corporation laws around the country as existing in "a
remarkably immature stage of development." 8
The old law in Arkansas had been amended several times to
remedy specific problems, 9 but the need was apparent for a complete
and modern code versus a continued patchwork of repairs. As
Chairman of the Tax Section in 1990-1991, Joe Erwin surveyed the
section membership about this problem, and the strong response led
him to form a committee charged with drafting a bar-sponsored
legislative proposal (hereinafter the "Committee").
A few examples of important deficiencies in the old law include
the following: provisions for the conduct of members' and directors'
meetings were sketchy; no statutory authority existed for action by
consent without a meeting; the law allowed amendments to the
articles but gave no guidance on how amendments were to be
approved by the corporation; 0 no procedures were prescribed for
approval of extraordinary transactions involving voluntary dissolution
or sale of substantially all the corporation's assets; there were no
statutory standards for measuring the duties of care and loyalty
owed by directors and officers; clear authority for the indemnification
of officers and directors was lacking.
6. Telephone Interview with Jim Werner, Secretary of State Staff Attorney
(Decevuber 16, 1993).
7. The annual revenues of nonprofits nationally have been estimated at nearly
$500 billion. Id.
8. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA.
L. REv. 497, 500 (1981); see J. Steven Rawlings, Liability of Officers and Directors:
Extending the Safe Harbor to Nonprofit Corporate Statutory Law, 16 N. Ky. L.
REv. 345, 350 (1989); see also Thomas H. Boyd, Comment, A Call to Reform of
the Duties of Directors Under State Not-For-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IOWA
L. REv. 725, 735 (1987).
9. 1983 Ark. Acts 614 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-28-301 to -309
(Michie 1987) (providing a statutory scheme for the merger of nonprofit corpo-
rations); see 1989 Ark. Acts 672 (adding two enhancements: authority for voting
by proxy (codified at ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-28-212(c) (Michie 1987)), and adding
rules for the corporation's acceptance of votes similar to those in the ABCA (Id.
§ 4-28-224)).
10, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-206(d) (Michie 1987).
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The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (hereinafter
"RMNCA")," developed under the auspices of the American Bar
Association, addresses those and many other concerns. In addition,
the model act is similar in its organization and its coverage of
comparable corporate issues to the Revised Model Business Cor-
poration Act, the basis for the Arkansas Business Corporation Act
of 1987 (hereinafter "ABCA"). The Committee believed similarity
between the RMNCA and ABCA would be viewed favorably by our
legislature and would contribute to familiarity and ease of use by
attorneys. Our neighbors in Tennessee and Mississippi had substan-
tially adopted the RMNCA after it was published as an exposure
draft. 2 Accordingly, when the Committee began its work on the
new Arkansas law, the RMNCA provided a natural blueprint. 3
Many differences exist, however, between the 1993 Arkansas
Act and the RMNCA. The substantial modifications reflect the
desired goal of designing a law which aligns our state's laws and
practices appropriately and which our legislature would likely favor.
It is beyond the scope of this article to describe all of the alterations,
but the provisions which concern recording and reporting require-
ments provide a good example. An entire chapter of the RMNCA
is devoted to the requirements for maintaining corporate records
and for filing reports with the Secretary of State. 4 One of the
guiding policies of the Committee was to secure the advantages of
a modern corporate code without unduly increasing the regulatory
burden on nonprofits. A great number of nonprofit corporations
are small organizations which would have difficulty complying with
increased requirements for filing forms with a government agency
if the regulatory burden were increased. Nevertheless, a majority of
the Committee believed that the law should require filing a simple
annual report to confirm the corporation's continued existence and
current information regarding its registered agent and address. How-
ever, even that simple requirement was objectionable to some leg-
islators; thus, it was eliminated from the Act.
11. The RMNCA was adopted in 1987 by the Subcommittee on the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Law of the Business Law Section of the American Bar
Association.
12. Lizabeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and How of the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, 16 N. Ky. L. REV. 251, 282 (1989).
13. Therefore, the Official Comments to the model act are very helpful to an
understanding of the Arkansas law. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, official
text with official comments and statutory cross-references, Michael C. Hone, Re-
porter (Prentice-Hall 1988).
14. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 16.01-16.22 (1988).
19941
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II. KEY FEATURES OF THE NEW ACT
A. Classification of Corporations under the Act
A central feature of RMNCA, which was included in the Arkansas
Act, is the establishment of three categories of nonprofit corporations:
public benefit corporations, mutual benefit corporations, and religious
corporations. Somewhat different rules and procedures apply to each
corporate type. The Act does not define permitted purposes for each
category, but the incorporators must choose which kind is most
appropriate and then abide by the prescribed set of rules. Thus, the
articles of incorporation contain a statement which declares the type
of corporation being formed."i
Choosing the appropriate corporate type is not as complicated
as it initially may seem. Most organizations will fit naturally into
only one of the three categories. The requirements for qualification
under the applicable federal tax exemption will further influence the
choice. For example, a corporation desiring exemption under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code must be either a public
benefit or religious corporation. Social welfare organizations normally
will be public benefit corporations under Internal Revenue Code
section 501(c)(4). Trade associations and chambers of commerce,
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(6), will
declare the mutual benefit category, as will recreational membership
clubs, exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(6), (7).
The choice of category is further simplified because under the
Act few differences exist concerning the rules which apply to the
three kinds of corporations, even fewer differences in fact than those
contained in the RMNCA. For example, in the procedure for approval
of conflict of interest transactions, the new Act does not include
the additional requirement that directors of a public benefit or
religious corporation must in good faith believe that the transaction
is fair to the corporation. 16 Instead, in all cases, to validate a conflict
of interest transaction, the Act requires that under the circumstances,
the transaction was in fact fair to the corporation at the time it
was entered into.'
7
Existing corporations electing to become subject to the Act do
not have a choice; the applicable category is determined by set
rules." Any corporation organized primarily or exclusively for religious
15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-202(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993).
16. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31(b) (1988).
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-831(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993).
18. Id. § 4-33-1707.
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purposes is a religious corporation. Those corporations other than
religious which are recognized as exempt under Internal Revenue
Code section 501(c)(3) are public benefit corporations. A corporation
which does not fit within those rules, but which nevertheless is
organized for a public or charitable purpose, and which upon
dissolution must distribute its assets to public benefit corporations
or Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) entities, is also a public
benefit corporation. Finally, if none of those rules fit, the corporation
is a mutual benefit corporation.
Most of the major differences in the rules arise from the premise
that members of mutual benefit corporations can have an economic
interest in the corporation, while members of public benefit or
religious corporations cannot. For this reason, an exception to the
general rule which prohibits distributions, allows a mutual benefit
corporation to make distributions in redemption of its memberships,
so long as those distributions do not render the corporation insolvent.19
Concomitantly, a mutual benefit corporation, upon dissolution, may
distribute its assets to its members, while all other corporations must
transfer them to other public benefit or religious corporations.2 0
The Act also contains certain limitations upon mergers; these
limitations apply exclusively to public benefit or religious corporations.
A public benefit or religious corporation can merge with a mutual
benefit corporation only if the public benefit or religious corporation
is the survivor and continues to be a public benefit or religious
corporation after the merger, unless the chancery court grants prior
approval. 21 In addition, unless the chancery court authorizes an
exception, members of a public benefit or religious corporation may
not receive corporate assets as a result of a merger, other than
membership in the surviving public benefit or religious corporation. 22
The procedures for amending the articles and bylaws illustrate
another difference that satisfies the members' economic interests in
mutual benefit corporations. The articles of a public benefit or
religious corporation may be amended by the directors without a
vote of the members, so long as the amendments do not alter the
19. Id. § 4-33-1302. Similarly, there is an exception to the general rule against
transfers of memberships, which permits the articles or bylaws of a mutual benefit
corporation to authorize such transfers. Id. § 4-33-611.
20. Id. § 4-33-1406(a)(6), (7). If the dissolving corporation is described in section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, there is a further restriction that the assets
may be transferred only to other section 501(c)(3) organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(West Supp. 1993).
21. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-1102(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
22. Id. § 4-33-1102(b).
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number, composition, term, or election of the directors.2 3 For mutual
benefit corporations, the members must approve amendments to the
articles by a two-thirds vote or a majority of the voting power,
whichever is less. 24 The same rules apply to bylaw amendments.
25
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the treatment of public
benefit and religious corporations under the Act is very similar. The
differences that do exist recognize the constitutional constraints upon
the state's regulation of religion. Indeed, the Act expressly declares
constitutional protection for religious corporations:
If religious doctrine governing the affairs of a religious corporation
is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter on the same
subject, the religious doctrine shall control to the extent required
by the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of
this state or both.
26
Although the RMNCA is the source of this provision, the provision
comports with the ruling of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Gipson
v. Brown. 27 Gipson held that under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Constitution
of Arkansas, 2 an incorporated church's denominational doctrine,
which provided that governance should vest solely in the elders,
must prevail over the conflicting statute which gave members the
right to inspect corporate records. The chancery court's attempt to
apply the old Arkansas Nonprofit Corporation Act was an
unconstitutional interference with the free exercise of religion, absent
a showing of a compelling state interest.
29
A recent development in this area is the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, by which Congress reinstated the "compelling
interest" test in response to Employment Division v. Smith.3 0 In
furtherance of its religious liberty policy, the new Act makes some
of its provisions inapplicable to religious corporations. For example,
the procedures for termination, expulsion, and suspension of members
23. Id. § 4-33-1003(a)(1).
24. Id. § 4-33-1003(a)(2).
25. Id. § 4-33-1021.
26. Id. § 4-33-180.
27. 295 Ark. 371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988).
28. ARK. CONST. art. 2, §§ 24-25.
29. For a thorough analysis of that decision and the two other appellate rulings
in the case (Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. 422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986), and Gipson
v. Munson, 296 Ark. 160, 752 S.W.2d 752 (1988)), see Tonia Peoples Jones, Note,
Constitutional Law-Religious Freedom-Forced Disclosure of Church Records Pur-
suant to State Non-Profit Corporation Statute Prohibited, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. J. 75 (1989-90).
30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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apply only to public and mutual benefit corporations.,a Other
provisions specifically permit a religious corporation's articles or
bylaws to restrict or eliminate their application. Examples include
the provisions regarding members' rights to inspect membership lists32
and to compel a special meeting with only five percent of the voting
power," and the procedures for removal of directors 4 and for judicial
dissolution. 3
B. Judicial Supervision
Another key distinction between the old and new acts is the
forum for judicial supervision of nonprofit corporations. To
incorporate under the old law, the articles were first filed with the
circuit court in the county where the principal office was located,
and then the articles, accompanied by a court order approving the
incorporation, were filed with the Secretary of State.36 Although
there is scant authority on the subject, the circuit court's participation
in the creation of a nonprofit raised questions concerning its continuing
jurisdiction over the corporation, at least with respect to matters
such as amending the articles and corporate dissolution.3 7 Those
questions will persist for old corporations which do not elect
governance by the new Act.
Although the new rules do not require the articles to be filed
or approved by the court, there are a number of circumstances in
which the Act provides for judicial intervention.18 In each instance
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-621 (Michie Supp. 1993).
32. Id. § 4-33-720.
33. Id. § 4-33-702(a)(2).
34. Id. § 4-33-808.
35. Id. § 4-33-1430.
36. Id. § 4-28-206 (Michie 1991).
37. In an injunction proceeding by one nonprofit corporation against a nonprofit
association, the chancery court was held to have proper jurisdiction because the
injunctive relief being sought was an equitable remedy. Fort Smith Symphony
Orchestra, Inc. v. Fort Smith Symphony Ass'n, 285 Ark. 284, 686 S.W.2d 418
(1985).
38. Examples of such judicial actions include: ordering the manner of conducting
a meeting or vote which is impossible or impractical to conduct otherwise (ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-33-160 (Michie Supp. 1993)); ordering a meeting to be held upon
application of a member when the corporation has failed to hold a meeting in
due course. (Id. § 4-33-703); removing a director upon a finding of fraudulent or
dishonest conduct, gross abuse of authority or discretion, or a final judgment
determining the director has violated a statutory duty (Id. § 4-33-810); dissolving
a corporation (Id. § 4-33-1430); and hearing an appeal (in Pulaski County Chancery
Court) from the Secretary of State's revocation of a foreign corporation's certificate
of authority (Id. § 4-33-1532).
19941
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the judicial role is assigned to the chancery courts.3 9 Traditional
common-law principles confer upon chancery the inherent and
exclusive jurisdiction over charitable as well as private trusts. 40 Thus,
the Committee believed that the chancery courts would provide the
most appropriate forum for dealing with nonprofit corporation issues.
C. Meetings and Action Without Meetings
1. Action Without Meetings
A significant advantage of the new Act is that the members
and directors possess the authority to take action by written consent
without a meeting. 4' Although directors may have acted in this
manner previously, no statutory authority existed for acting without
a meeting under the old law. Unless the articles or bylaws provide
otherwise, the new Act permits the directors to take any action
which could be taken at a board meeting by drafting one or more
written consents which describe the action, contain the signatures
of all directors, and are included in the minutes filed with the
corporate records which reflect the action taken. 42 A consent has
the same effect as a meeting vote and may be described as such in
any document. 43 An action taken in this manner is effective when
the last director signs the consent, unless the consent specifies a
different effective date." To facilitate rapid written action by directors,
the statute makes valid a consent which is delivered by facsimile
transmittal
5.4
A similar provision allows the members to act without a meeting
if an action is approved by written consent from members holding
at least eighty percent of the voting power. 6 If approval is not
obtained from all members, however, the action is not effective until
ten days after the nonconsenting members receive written notice of
the action.4 7
39. The only exceptions concern proceedings in other courts. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-33-854 (Michie Supp. 1993) (regarding indemnification of a director by
the court which is the forum of the proceeding); Id. § 4-33-1007 (concerning
amendment of the articles by a federal court to implement a plan of reorganization).
40. Long Trust v. Holk, 315 Ark. 112, 864 S.W.2d 869 (1993).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-821.
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-821(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
43. Id. § 4-33-821(d).
44. Id. § 4-33-821(b).
45. Id. § 4-33-821(c).
46. Id. § 4-33-704(a).
47. Id. § 4-33-704(d).
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The members also have the alternative of taking action by written
ballot. 48 This form of action is valid only when the number of votes
cast by ballot, and the number of approvals obtained, at least equals
the quorum and affirmative vote that would be required to approve
the action if it were taken at a meeting. 49 Additionally, solicitations
for votes by written ballots must include the following information:
the number of ballots needed to meet the quorum requirement; the
percentage of approvals necessary to approve each matter (except
election of directors); and the date by which the ballot must be
received to be counted.50
2. Administrative Requirements for Meetings of Members
Except for the sketchy provision on voting," the old law neither
imposed requirements nor provided guidance on the conduct of
members' meetings. In contrast, the new Act contains very detailed
procedures that must be followed in calling and conducting meetings.
In considering whether to be governed by the new Act, the members
and directors of an existing corporation need to be familiar with
these requirements and determine to abide by them.
Generally, a corporation must give notice of meetings, consistent
with its bylaws, in a fair and reasonable manner; to avoid any
question, however, notice of all annual, regular, and special meetings
should comply with a statutory safe harbor.12 That standard is met
when notice is mailed first class no fewer than ten days, nor more
than sixty days before the meeting date." The safe harbor provides
that notice of any special meeting must give the reason for which
the meeting is called; even notice of annual or regular meetings
must describe certain extraordinary items for which member approval
is required by statute.5 4 A member may waive the notice requirement
either in writing or by his attendance at a meeting."
At times, neither the bylaws nor the board of directors fix a
record date to determine the members who are entitled to notice
and to -vote. When no record date is declared, then the default
record date for notice is the day before notice is given; additionally,
the default record date for voting is the date of the meeting.5 6
48. Id. § 4-33-708.
49. Id. § 4-33-708(c).
50. Id. § 4-33-708(d)(1)-(3).
51. Id. § 4-28-212 (Michie 1991).
52. Id. § 4-33-705 (Michie Supp. 1993).
53. Id. § 4-33-705(c)(1).
54. Id. § 4-33-705(c)(2), (3).
55. Id. § 4-33-706.
56. Id. § 4-33-707.
19941
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After fixing a record date, the corporation must prepare an
alphabetical list of all members entitled to notice of the meeting;
the list must show the address and number of votes each member
is entitled to cast.57 The list of members entitled to vote must be
updated through the time of the meeting.58 The list must be available
for inspection by any member, or member's attorney or agent, before
and at the meeting. 59 However, the statute places protections upon
the list by prohibiting its unauthorized use for any commercial
purpose, for soliciting money (except to seek votes in an election
to be held by the corporation), or for any other purpose unrelated
to a member's interest as a member 0
In conducting a member vote, the default quorum requirement
is ten percent, but the articles or bylaws can provide for a higher
or lower quorum. 6' However, a quorum of one-third of the voting
power is required at an annual or regular meeting for any matter
not disclosed in the notice. 62 If a quorum is present, the members
can act by the affirmative vote of a majority unless the articles or
bylaws, or special provisions of the new Act, require a greater vote
or require voting by class. 63 Unless the articles or bylaws provide
otherwise, each member is entitled to one vote, except that a member
holding more than one membership has one vote for each membership,
as under the old law. 64 Like the amended old law, the new Act
contains a set of rules for proxy voting, but the articles or bylaws
can prohibit or limit that type of vote. 65 There is also a counterpart
to a voting trust provision which allows members to execute an
agreement to vote in a certain manner. 66 Such agreements are valid
for up to ten years and are specifically enforceable.
67
In the election of directors, the articles or bylaws can provide
for cumulative voting by members. 68 To authorize such voting at
any particular meeting, however, the meeting notice must state that
cumulative voting will occur, and at least one member must give
notice at the meeting that he intends to cumulate votes. 69 Alternative
57. Id. § 4-33-720(a).
58. Id. § 4-33-720(a).
59. Id. § 4-33-720(b).
60. Id. § 4-33-720(d)(1), (2).
61. Id. § 4-33-722(a).
62. Id. § 4-33-722(d).
63. Id. § 4-33-723(a).
64. Id. § 4-33-721(a).
65. Id. § 4-33-724(a).
66. Id. § 4-33-730.
67. Id. § 4-33-730.
68. Id. § 4-33-725.
69. Id. § 4-33-725(b)(1), (2).
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methods of electing directors are allowed, including election by
chapter or region, by preferential voting, or by any other reasonable
method .70
3. Meetings of Directors
The rules for directors' meetings are simple and analogous to
the provisions of the ABCA. A meeting can be conducted through
the use of any means of communication by which all participating
directors can simultaneously hear each other. 7' Regular meetings can
be held without notice;72 special meetings generally require two days'
notice;73 and meetings can be called by the president, the chairman
of the board, or twenty percent of the directors. 74 Unless the articles,
bylaws or special provisions of the Act provide otherwise, a majority
of the directors constitutes a quorum, 75 and the affirmative vote of
a majority of the directors present constitutes board action. 76
4. Emergency Bylaws and Powers
Every organization should make contingency plans concerning
corporate functions should a natural disaster or other emergency
occur. The new Act has two provisions designed to facilitate action
during an "emergency," for example, when a catastrophic event
prevents the board from assembling a quorum.7 7 Primarily, the
directors may adopt bylaws containing procedures for managing the
corporation during an emergency, including how to convene the
board, relaxed quorum requirements, and designation of additional
or substitute directors. 78 Secondly, a few special powers are granted
to the directors to make it easier to function during an emergency.7 9
D. Fiduciary Liability of Directors
A director is a type of fiduciary. 80 His status has a variety of
attributes, some of which relate to his representative capacity if
70. Id. § 4-33-726.
71. Id. § 4-33-820(c).
72. Id. § 4-33-822(a).
73. Id. § 4-33-822(b).
74. Id. § 4-33-822(d).
75. Id. § 4-33-824(a).
76. Id. § 4-33-824.
77. Id. § 4-33-207(d).
78. Id. § 4-33-207(a)(1)-(3).
79. Id. § 4-33-303.
80. See OLECK, supra note 5, at § 265; see also Hall v. Staha, 303 Ark. 673,
800 S.W.2d 396 (1990) (discussing Arkansas theories in a business corporation
context), reh'g denied, 314 Ark. 71, 858 S.W.2d 672 (1993).
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UALR LAW JOURNAL
elected by members, some of which are similar to the characteristics
of an agent, and some of which are like those of a trustee of an
express trust of property."1 Yet, the relationship which a director
has to corporate property is not considered as strict as that of a
trustee."2 Thus, despite the similarities, there are significant differences
in the standards of responsibility which are applicable to directors
and trustees. Under present law, it is not clear whether nonprofit
directors should be treated as corporate directors or as trustees. By
adopting the less stringent corporate standard, the 1993 Act not
only provides a clear answer to this question, but also addresses
the fear of personal liability and encourages people to serve on
nonprofit boards. The greater protection afforded to directors strongly
favors election under the new Act.
1. Liability of Directors Versus Liability of Trustees
Generally, the points of comparison between director liability
and liability of trustees are in three areas: responsibility for
management and investment, personal liability for contractual
obligations, and vicarious liability for torts of agents. At common
law, trustees are held to a higher standard of care in the exercise
of their management and investment responsibilities. Trustees also
may be personally liable for contractual obligations of the entity
unless the contract expressly provides otherwise. In the case of private
trusts at least, trustees may have personal liability for the tortious
conduct of agents and employees, while corporate directors normally
do not have such personal liability.
a. Management and Investment
Corporate directors, as well as trustees, can be liable for losses
caused by their negligent mismanagement. However, while trustees
are often held to a higher standard of care and may be liable for
simple negligence, directors normally are not liable for mere mistakes
in judgment, but must have committed gross negligence, intentional
misconduct, or some other egregious act.83
Despite that difference under common law, the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act84 creates a common standard
81. OLECK, supra note 5, at § 265.
82. OLECK, supra note 5, at § 265.
83. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch., 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C.
1974).




for trustees and directors in the exercise of their investment
responsibilities on behalf of the organizations subject to that act.
For the governing boards of charitable, religious, and educational
institutions, whether incorporated or not, this law establishes a
standard of conduct for the management of funds held exclusively
for the institution's own charitable purposes.85 That standard is
expressed as follows:
In the administration of the powers to appropriate appreciation,
to make and retain investments, and to delegate investment
management of institutional funds, members of a governing board
shall exercise ordinary business care and prudence under the facts
and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision.
In so doing they shall consider long and short term needs of the
institution in carrying out its educational, religious, charitable,
or other eleemosynary purposes, its present and anticipated financial
requirements, expected total return on its investment, price level
trends, and general economic conditions.8 6
b. Contracts
A corporate director usually is not personally liable for the
contractual obligations of the corporation. Under general common
law rules, however, trustees are personally liable for a contract
executed by the trustees, unless such liability is expressly excluded
by the terms of the contract.8 7 This rule of personal contract liability




Although traditional common law rules impose personal liability
upon the trustees of a private trust for the torts of its agents,8 9 that
85. It does not apply to the management of funds in charitable remainder trusts
or charitable lead trusts, however, because those "split-interest" trusts have private
as well as charitable interests. Id. § 28-69-602(2).
86. Id. § 28-69-607. Section 1809 of the 1993 Act repeals all laws and parts of
laws in conflict with the new Act. 1993 Ark. Acts 1147 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-33-1705 (Michie Supp. 1993)). Thus, if in a given case there is a conflict
between the standards of conduct prescribed in these two laws, the standards in
the 1993 Act should prevail. Because both laws use an ordinary prudent person
standard, however, there does not seem to be a significant difference regarding
the standard of care for investment decisions.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 266-271 (1959); GEORGE G. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 712 (rev. 2d ed. 1993); Betts v. Hackathorn,
159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602, 31 A.L.R. 847 (1923).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 403; BOGERT, supra note 87, at § 401.




rule does not apply for charitable trusts. In states like Arkansas,
where the doctrine of charitable immunity still applies, 9° the doctrine
protects both trustees and charitable corporation directors from
personal liability for the torts of agents. 9' However, how are nonprofit
corporations treated when they do not qualify as charitable? If the
private trustee standard were applied, vicarious liability would exist.
The standard for corporate directors, on the other hand, generally
does not hold them personally liable for the negligence of the
corporation's agents and employees, absent unusual circumstances.
Concerned with directors' potential exposure to vicarious liability,
the 1987 Legislature enacted a measure designed to protect the
directors of tax exempt nonprofit corporations; this measure granted
those directors immunity from personal liability for the negligence
of employees and other directors. 92 The immunity rule applies not
just to directors of charitable corporations exempt under Internal
Revenue Code § 501(c)(3), but to those of any nonprofit corporation
"that holds a valid federal income tax exemption issued by the
Internal Revenue Service." 9s Yet, it is not uncommon in practice to
encounter nonprofit corporations of the mutual benefit type which
have not applied to the Internal Revenue Service for recognition of
exemption. Some organizations, trade associations for example, are
entitled to be recognized as exempt without the issuance of an
exemption letter by the Service. Directors of those corporations may
find under the new Act an additional degree of protection from
vicarious liability as long as they meet the standards of conduct
prescribed therein.
2. What Standard of Conduct Applies to Nonprofit
Corporation Directors?
Historically, some cases have measured the conduct of nonprofit
corporation directors by the standards applicable to corporate directors
generally, while other courts have held them to the more strict
90. Bonham v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 288 Ark. 69, 702 S.W.2d
16 (1986); Williams v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d
243 (1969).
91. BOGERT, supra note 69, at § 402. Cf., LeMay v. Trinity Lutheran Church,
248 Ark. 119, 450 S.W.2d 297 (1970) (reasoning that the doctrine was grounds
for dismissal of suit for damages from fallen tree against Chairman of the Board
as well as Church).
92. 1987 Ark. Acts 970 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-120-101 to -104
(Michie Supp. 1993)). The grant of immunity, however, does not extend to a
director's personal negligence. Id. § 16-120-103(a).
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-120-102(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
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standards applicable to trustees. 94 Advocates of the latter view recite
the attributes of a director's function, especially in a charitable
corporation, which are comparable to those of trustees of charitable
trust property. 9 The modern judicial trend, however, is to apply
the corporate, rather than the trust, standard of care to the directors
of nonprofit corporations. 96 One rationale for this view has been
expressed as follows:
The trustee standard is excessively demanding for most directors
of nonprofit organizations. Trustees are subject to the highest
standards of care and fiduciary conduct. Directors of nonprofit
organizations often have other full-time positions and perform
their duties as an avocational community service. The "prudent
director" test is more realistic and more flexible than the trustee
standards.
97
Additionally, corporate directors may have many areas of
responsibility, while a trustee seldom must supervise substantial
operations. A trustee's responsibilities more typically are restricted
to management of trust funds and disbursement in accordance with
the terms of the trust. Accordingly, trustees can be expected to
devote more time and expertise to the management of trust funds
and investments. In contrast, the directors of large charitable
corporations, like hospitals and universities, must supervise the
operation of a wide variety of facilities and activities. Since that
functioning more closely resembles the corporate model, the less
stringent corporate standard of care is more appropriate. This is
the approach taken by the RMNCA and the Arkansas Nonprofit
Corporation Act of 1993.
3. Standards of Conduct Under the Act
The standards of conduct for directors are established in four
sections of the new Act dealing respectively with general standards,
conflicts of interest, prohibition of loans to directors, and liability
94. See J. Thomas Eubank, Jr., et al., Duties of Charitable Trust Trustees and
Charitable Corporation Directors, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. T. 545 (1967).
95. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled
State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960); see also OLECK, supra note 5,
at § 265.
96. Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
97. Harry G. Henn & Jeffer H. Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations: California Here We Come!, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1103, 1129-30
(1981). For a discussion of the fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors generally,
see William J. Jarvis, Note, The Nonprofit Director's Fiduciary Duty: Toward a
New Theory of the Nonprofit Sector, 77 NW. U.L. REV. 34 (1982).
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for unlawful distributions. Because the 1993 Act adopts the ABCA
rule concerning general standards of director conduct, the development
of that rule for business corporations is important to understanding
the new measure for nonprofit directors.
Under the common law, the fiduciary duties owed by a director
to a business corporation consist primarily of the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty.98 The duty of care or diligence requires a director
to act with the care of an ordinary prudent person in a like position
under similar circumstances. That familiar expression of the duty
of care is codified among the general standards of conduct set forth
in the ABCA.99 This corporate standard of care acknowledges that
directors are not guarantors of the success of investments or operations.
They can balance risks and rewards, and they are allowed discretion
in exercising the judgment necessary to meet the goals of the
organization.
The common law duty of loyalty requires directors to act in
good faith and in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the
best interests of the corporation. That aspect of the duty of loyalty
also is included in the general standard under the ABCA. The duty
of loyalty also requires directors to refrain from engaging in their
own personal activities in such a manner as to injure or take
advantage of the corporation.1°° Directors may not derive secret or
private profits from official positions, and must give the corporation
the benefit of any advantages obtained as a result of an official
position. The ABCA has a rule specifically dealing with director
conflict of interest transactions. o10
Directors also owe a duty of obedience which requires adherence
to the purposes stated in the charter of the corporation. This duty
is equally important in a nonprofit corporation to justify the reliance
of donors on the faithfulness of the corporation to the charitable
purposes which they intend to support. 0 2
98. See generally Alan C. Geolot, Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and
Care Associated with the Directors and Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64
VA. L. REV. 449 (1978).
99. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-830 (Michie 1991).
100. See generally Susan Webber [now United States District Judge Susan Webber
Wright], Arkansas Corporate Fiduciary Standards-Interested Directors' Contracts
and the Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 39
(1982).
101. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-831 (Michie 1987).
102. Wayne E. Borgeest, Evaluating the Exposure of Officers and Directors of
Nonprofit Corporations, in TORT LIABILITY FOR CHARITABLE RELIGIOUS AND NON-




In the context of these principles of business corporation law,
the new Act prescribes the general standards of conduct for directors
in language which is almost identical to Section 830 of the ABCA.' °3
The new Act provides that a director shall discharge his or her
duties, including those as a committee member, in good faith, with
the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances, and in a manner the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 04 In meeting
that standard, a director is entitled to rely on information from
staff, committees of the board, and the corporation's attorneys and
accountants, in circumstances under which the director reasonably
believes the information is reliable. A director is not acting in good
faith, however, if he possesses knowledge that makes reliance on
such information unwarranted. A director acting in compliance with
that standard is not liable to the corporation, to any member, or
to any other person. This exoneration of directors from liability is
automatic, and it protects them from the claims of third parties.' °5
As is the case under the existing immunity statute, however, a director
is not exonerated from his own tortious conduct.
Section 830 of the new Act contains the additional statement
that a director shall not be deemed to be a trustee with respect to
property of the corporation, including any that may be subject to
restrictions imposed by a donor."°6 This rule insulates directors from
personal liability for claims of breach of trust by donors unhappy
with the way donated assets have been used. It is important, however,
to distinguish the responsibility of the directors from the responsibility
of the corporation. The corporation can be considered a trust even
if the directors are not held to the same standard of conduct as
trustees. While trustees, and not directors, hold legal title to trust
property, the corporation is the holder of legal title to its assets.
In that capacity, the corporation is impressed with a trust that its
property be used consistently with the expressed charitable purposes
and with any additional restrictions imposed by donors as conditions
of their gifts. 107 Thus, the law may permit a charitable corporation
to be sued for breach of trust even though the directors are exonerated
103. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-830 (Michie Supp. 1993).
104. Id.
105. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CoRP. ACT § 8.30, cmt. 9 (1988).
106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-830(e) (Michie Supp. 1993).
107. Bennet B. Harvey, Jr., The Public-Spirited Defendant and Others: Liability




by statute from such claims. 108 This corporate trust concept led the
drafters of the RMNCA to exclude claims which allege that the
corporation lacks power to dispose of assets held in charitable trust
from the general rule prohibiting challenges on ultra vires grounds. 1°9
It seemed to our Committee also that this approach strikes an
acceptable balance between the interests of encouraging community
service, by limiting potential director liability, and encouraging the
support of charity by preserving donors' reliance upon a corporation's
faithfulness to use gifts for their intended purposes.
These basic rules of Section 830 are designed as the exclusive
standards by which to measure directors' conduct. Just as the statutory
models from which they are derived, the rules are subject to further
development by judicial interpretation and application. This statute
and the context of its origins will provide the blueprint for those
decisions.
b. Business Judgment Rule
Uncertainty exists as to whether and under what circumstances
the business judgment rule may be applied to nonprofit corporations.
On the premise that directors of business corporations are better
equipped to make business judgments, courts will sometimes defer
to their judgment and will apply the rule to create a rebuttable
presumption that the directors acted in good faith, with reasonable
diligence, and without self-dealing or personal interest." 0 Section 830
of the ABCA does not attempt to codify the business judgment rule
or to delineate any conflict which may exist between the statutory
standard and the rule."' The new Act follows that approach for
nonprofits as well. If a nonprofit director meets the standards of
Section 830, no issue exists concerning the application of the business
Jt U IL1 IIL IUIL¢. l 1..€ € 11,.li.1 ..¢ IILItl ll€i tv J AA A .. v
be established, however, then a court may consider the application
of the rule." 2 It may seem odd to consider the business judgment
rule for corporations which do not engage in business for profit.
Yet, the fundamental theory of the rule sensibly applies for determining
the financial decisions and other important determinations which
108. Id.
109. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04, cmt (1988).
110. Hall, 303 Ark. at 678, 800 S.W.2d at 399.
111. See Frances Fendler Rosenzweig, Director-Exculpation Clauses under the
Arkansas Business Corporation Act of 1987, 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 337,
341 (1993); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30, cmt (1983).
112. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, § 830, cmt. 3 (1988).
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nonprofit boards must make; indeed, some courts have applied the
rule to nonprofits." 3
c. Exculpation Provision Not Adopted
The RMNCA contains an alternate section 8.30(d), which allows
the corporation, by including a provision in the articles of
incorporation, to limit or eliminate directors' liability for damages
for breach of the duty of care. Like its business corporation
counterpart, the optional director-exculpation clause is severely limited;
the clause does not permit the articles to limit director liability for
breach of the duty of loyalty, for actions not in good faith, for
intentional misconduct, or where a director derives an improper
personal economic benefit. This alternate provision was derived from
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which
was enacted following an adverse decision of the Delaware Supreme
Court." 4 The specific problem that was the impetus for the legislation
concerned a dispute over the adequacy of the price at which a merger
was approved. The policy goals of that measure are understandable,
and the Committee was aware that our legislature had enacted the
ABCA with an exculpation clause." 5 In the nonprofit context, however,
the Committee believed that it would be bad policy to permit the
exculpation of directors from fulfilling the basic corporate duty of
care. For that reason, the Committee decided not to include an
exculpation clause in the legislative proposal.
d. Conflicts of Interest
The conflict of interest section of the new Act establishes an
additional standard of director conduct which provides a clear pathway
for the corporation to approve or to ratify director conflict of
interest transactions." 6 A conflict of interest transaction occurs when
a corporation enters a transaction in which a director has a direct
or indirect interest. A director has an indirect interest in a transaction
if the director has a material interest or is a general partner, officer,
director, or trustee of the entity which is a party to the transaction.
A conflict of interest transaction is not voidable if the transaction
113. Yarnall Warehouse & Transfer, Inc. v. Three Ivory Bros. Moving Co., 226
So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
170 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1948).
114. See Rosenzweig, supra note 92, at 339-40; REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
ACT alternative section 8.30, cmt. (1988).
115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202 (Michie 1987).
116. Id. § 4-33-831 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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was fair to the corporation at the time it was entered into; disclosure
of the material facts of the transaction, and the director's interest,
was made or known to the board of directors, and the board
authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction; or, the material
facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or
known to the members and the members authorized, approved, or
ratified the transaction.
This standard of the new Arkansas Act differs slightly from
the model act. In both acts, a demonstration of actual fairness
suffices without meeting any approval test. But under Section 8.31
of the RMNCA, the circumstances in which a conflict of interest
transaction may be validated by approval are somewhat more restricted
for public benefit and religious corporations than for mutual benefit
corporations. For the latter, advance approval or later ratification
by the members or directors after full disclosure suffices; for the
former, advance approval by the directors after full disclosure is
required, and there is an additional requirement that the directors
approving the transaction must in good faith reasonably believe it
to be fair to the corporation. While appreciating the policy behind
the provision, the Committee believed that having those different
standards would unnecessarily add to the complexity of dealing with
the new law. The common requirement for all corporations under
the Arkansas Act, that either the actual fairness test or the full
disclosure test must be met, is an adequate safeguard for dealing
with conflict of interest transactions.
A conflict of interest transaction is approved if it receives the
affirmative vote of a majority of the directors on the board who
have no direct or indirect interest in the transaction. However, a
transaction may not be approved by a single director. If a majority
of the directors on the board who have no interest in the transaction
vote to approve the transaction, a quorum is present for thi purpose.
The articles, bylaws, or resolutions of the board may impose additional
requirements on conflict of interest transactions.
e. Loans and Distributions
A nonprofit corporation may not lend money to or guarantee
the obligation of a director or officer of the corporation.1 7 However,
a violation of that rule does not affect the borrower's liability on
the loan. Under the new Act, a director who votes for or assents
to an unlawful distribution is liable to the corporation unless the
117. Id. § 4-33-832.
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director complies with the standards of conduct described above." 8
E. Indemnification of Directors and Officers
The practice of indemnifying nonprofit directors was not unheard
of previously, but no statutory authority existed for it. By providing
for indemnification in several ways, the 1993 Act contains additional
protection for directors. To the extent that a director is wholly
successful (on the merits or otherwise) in the defense of a proceeding,
the statute requires the corporation to indemnify against legal expenses,
unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise." 9 Even if the
director is unsuccessful in his defense, however, the corporation is
permitted to indemnify against judgments, settlements, and expenses,
including attorneys' fees, if the director acted in good faith and in
a manner he reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the
corporation. 20 An adverse ruling in the proceeding is not determinative
that the director failed to meet those standards. Where a corporation
has failed to pay a director who is otherwise entitled to indemnification
under either provision, the director may apply to the court conducting
the proceeding or to another court of competent jurisdiction for an
order compelling payment by the corporation.' 2 ' Similar rules apply
to indemnification of officers.122 Another section expressly authorizes
a nonprofit corporation to maintain directors' and officers' liability
insurance, whether or not it has the power to indemnify under either
the mandatory or permitted indemnity rules. 23
Authority for indemnification pursuant to the new Act may be
expressed in the articles, bylaws, resolutions of members or directors,
or in a written contract or otherwise, but any such expression of
authority must be consistent with the indemnification provisions of
the Act. 24 Before any permitted indemnity may be offered, the
corporation must make a determination in that specific case that
the prerequisite standards of conduct have been met. 25 That
determination may be made in any of four different ways. If a
quorum can be obtained from among the directors who are not
involved in the proceeding, a majority of that quorum can make
the determination. The board can appoint a committee of directors
118. Id. § 4-33-833.
119. Id. § 4-33-852.
120. Id. § 4-33-851.
121. Id. § 4-33-854.
122. Id. § 4-33-856.
123. Id. § 4-33-857.
124. Id. § 4-33-858.
125. Id. § 4-33-855.
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who are not parties to the proceeding to decide the issue. Special
legal counsel can be appointed to make the determination, especially
where all of the directors are parties. In the case of a mutual benefit
corporation, the decision can be made by the members.
F. Officers
The Act requires a nonprofit corporation to have at least a
president, a secretary, and a treasurer, unless the articles or bylaws
provide otherwise. However, the same person may simultaneously
hold more than one office. 26 Apparently without allowing any
exception, the old act could be construed to require the service of
at least four persons as officers: those three named above, plus a
vice-president. 27 The standards of conduct for officers with
discretionary authority are similar to those applicable to directors.
28
The directors may remove any officer at any time with or without
cause, 29 but just as the appointment of an officer does not create
contract rights, removal does not affect the officer's contract rights. 30
If a contract or other instrument is signed by the chairman and
president, or by one of them plus a vice-president, secretary, treasurer,
or executive director, the corporation is bound by the document
unless the other party knew the officers signed it without authority.'
III. FACTORS FAVORING THE ELECTION
The preceding description of a few key features of the new Act
highlights some of its most important benefits for old corporations
considering election under the new Act. In the broadest sense, the
provision of a comprehensive set of laws for the management of a
nonprofit corporation is perhaps the greatest advantage of the Act.
The ultra vires statute, the clear and complete rules for conducting
meetings of members and directors, and the authorization for taking
action without a meeting, all facilitate the approval of corporate
transactions in a manner which is less likely to be challenged. The
elimination of procedural questions regarding amendments to the
126. Id. § 4-33-840(c). Because the number of directors must be no less than
three, however, there can be no one-man nonprofit corporations. Id. § 4-33-803.
127. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-213 (Michie 1987).
128. Id. § 4-33-842 (Michie Supp. 1993).
129. Id. § 4-33-843(b).
130. Id. § 4-33-844.
131. Id. § 4-33-845.
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articles, voluntary dissolution, and the sale of substantially all assets,
makes it easier to accomplish those transactions in a valid manner.
Even though they may apply only rarely, the provisions for acting
in an emergency are an enhancement as well.
In addition, the conflict of interest rules, which allow a clear
way to approve transactions with directors' firms, can be important
to many nonprofit organizations. Because the governing boards of
such corporations are often broadly representative of the businesses
in a community, a nonprofit board often includes persons affiliated
with banks which have loans with the corporation, securities firms
which hold investments for it, contractors who construct facilities
for it, and other vendors who supply various products or services
to the organization. Those relationships can be important to the
success of a nonprofit organization. Thus, a distinct advantage of
the new law is that it provides a fair method for approving trans-
actions with companies represented on the board in a manner which
is certain to be valid and which is without risk of personal liability
to the directors.
In many cases, one of the strongest incentives to elect under
the new law will be to take advantage of the statutory provisions
for indemnification of directors. Even though few reported Arkansas
decisions exist which involve claims of personal liability on the part
of corporate directors, litigation against nonprofits and their directors
is increasing nationally. Some of the types of claims asserted include
employment discrimination, sexual harassment, claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, breach of contract, fraud and con-
version, negligent hiring, damages for injuries sustained at sponsored
events, environmental liabilities, antitrust violations, and securities
law violations. 3 2 The clear authority to indemnify directors and to
provide directors' and officers' insurance will be increasingly im-
portant if nonprofit corporations are to continue to attract capable
people for service without compensation on their boards. No Arkansas
cases concern this issue, but other states' courts have ruled that
there is no right to indemnification in the absence of express statutory
authority.' The provisions in the new Act for mandatory indem-
nification where the prerequisites are met, for voluntary indemni-
fication by the corporation, and for the purchase of directors' and
132. See, e.g., Borgeest, supra note 102, at 7; Harvey, supra note 107, at 669-
733.




officers' insurance will eliminate any questions about authority to
insure and to indemnify for corporations which elect to be governed
by the new law.
Similarly, clarifying the standards of conduct for directors as
the more lenient corporate measure will encourage community, service
and will offer another primary reason for nonprofits to consider
the election. Although in our state the doctrine of charitable immunity
continues to protect directors from vicarious liability for the torts
of employees, there can be questions about whether a particular
corporation qualifies as a charity. 3 4 While our immunity statute
affords additional protection to the directors of all tax exempt
corporations, some nonprofits do not have an exemption letter from
the Internal Revenue Service. Furthermore, suits against directors
involving many of the other types of claims mentioned above may
not fall under the immunity umbrella. The exoneration from third
party claims of directors who comply with the exclusive standards
of conduct under the new Act will provide a convincing reason for
many corporations to make the election.
IV. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING THE ELECTION
A nonprofit corporation, incorporated under the old statutes,
may elect to be governed by the provisions of the new Act by
amending its articles of incorporation to so provide.135 The amended
articles, of course, must declare the correct classification pursuant
to the fixed rules for existing corporations, and must otherwise
comply with the new law. The amendment does not have to be
approved by the circuit court.'36 This election may be made at any
time after December 31, 1993. Once the election is made, it is
irrevocable. The amendment effecting the election must be approved
by a two-thirds vote of the members, or if there are no members,
b a twt-_th rrs vnte of thp rtrrotr¢ c Exicting corporations which
do not elect to be governed by the new Act will continue to be
governed by the old law.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion obviously is summary in nature, and
it would be impossible here to identify every facet of Arkansas law
134. Crossett Health Ctr. v. Crosswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-1701 (Michie Supp. 1993).
136. The old statute on amendments only requires filing with the Secretary of
State (ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-206(d) (Michie 1987)), and the Office of the Secretary
of State advises that it will not require a circuit court order approving the amend-




which will be significant to those pre-1994 corporations considering
the new Act election. Each corporation should independently research
the issue with the assistance of counsel. Especially because it is
irrevocable, the election should be made only after careful delib-
erations among the staff, directors, and members. Their study of
the new law should include a review of the rules and procedures
that would become applicable to their type of corporation, and a
determination that the organization can effectively function under
those rules. For example, compliance with the detailed administrative
rules for conducting meetings and votes may be a burden for some
entities which have members. There also may be problems posed
by the new Act that are specific to particular organizations. Yet,
the key advantages, gaining a comprehensive set of corporate laws,
facilitating valid corporate action, authorizing indemnification, and
establishing clear standards of conduct, which provide directors with
greater protection in an increasingly litigious society, will influence
many corporations to make the election to be governed by the new
Act.
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